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Abstract
I analyse a yardstick competition game using a spatial voting model,
where voters vote for a candidate according to the distance between
their Ideal Point and the policy selected by a candidate. The policy
which is closest to a voter’s IP provides the voter with a higher util-
ity so that minimizing the distance means maximising the utility. I
demonstrate that in the presence of asymmetrical information the ex-
istence of yardstick competition entails a selection device but not a
discipline device, suggesting the existence of a trade off between these
two goals. In the second part, I analyse an economic environment
characterised by the presence of shocks, whose sign and magnitude are
a private information of incumbents. This time, the introduction of
yardstick competition acts both as a selection and a discipline device.
1DEFAP - Universita’ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore - Milan; e-mail address:
emanuele.canegrati@unicatt.it
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1 Introduction
Is yardstick competition beneficial for voters’ welfare? This question still has
not found a clear answer in the literature and depends on another interest-
ing question. Are governments benevolent or Leviathan? Economists who
believe that governments are welfaristic, naturally tended to assume that re-
sults in the economy are efficient and, as a consequence, inter-governmental
yardstick competition generates negative externalities that lower the total
welfare. Otherwise, some other economists who believe that governments
are rent-seekers suggest that yardstick competition may act as a discipline
device and thus is beneficial. In a recent work Oll ([16]) argued in his intro-
duction: “In a decentralised tax system, a means of demonstrating to voters
that a tax increase is necessary is to show that taxes are higher elsewhere
for the same benefits provided”and “by threatening to punish at the pools
local officials imposing tax rates out of line with other jurisdictions, voters
compel incumbents to look at other localities’ taxing behavior when deter-
mining taxes, which sets the stage for tax-mimicking behavior”. Actually,
those seem rather two extreme positions. It is more realistic to imagine
a world populated by both good and bad governments. This assumption
allows for the possibility to consider a game theoretic environment where
the two types of government take their decisions, taking into account the
existence of other types of government. A complication derives from the ex-
istence of adverse selection and moral hazard issues which prevent to identify
the true nature of a government and whether policies undertaken are the
right ones. Thus, the key point is to evaluate whether the yardstick compe-
tition is able to reduce the negative effects of the asymmetrical information;
in other words it would be crucial to understand whether a yardstick com-
petition is able both to achieve a selection effect, achievable when a type
of government is forced to reveal itself as his true type, and a discipline ef-
fect, achievable when the bad government refrain itself to divert rents away
from voters’ welfare. Many works have provided theoretical support and
empirical evidence, but up to now there is no clear evidence about effects
the yardstick competition entails. A theoretical and empirical example was
originally developed by Besley and Case ([6]), who show that in the presence
of agency problems where voters are able to appraise the incumbents’ rel-
ative performance, different equilibria may arise. For instance, when there
exist both the good and the bad type of government, the yardstick compe-
tition entails a selection effects (the bad type prefers immediately to divert
resources in the first period knowing he will lose the elections). In another
paper, Basley & Smart ([3]) argue that the yardstick competition is likely
to be welfare improving for voters when it is more likely that politicians
are benevolent and bad for welfare when it is most likely that politicians
are Leviathan. Thus, the results are still ambiguous, depending on the pa-
rameter of the model. Nevertheless, it seems that the yardstick competition
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enforces more the selection than the discipline effect. On the negative side
are also Bordignon et al. ([7]), which used a theoretical tax-setting model
which demonstrates how the yardstick competition may induce more pool-
ing or separating behavior among different types of government, depending
on model parameters.
The goal of this paper is twofold: first of all, it analyses a typical yardstick
competition game from a new perspective represented by a spatial voting
model. Spatial voting models have been deeply studied in the literature
from a theoretical perspective2, but strange enough these studies still have
not found many applications in real economic problems. One of the main
assumptions of a spatial voting model is that individuals have an Ideal Point
(IP) in a multi issue space, which represents the point where they get the
maximum satisfaction. As a consequence, it is natural to think they vote for
a candidate who sets the closest policy to their IP. Roughly speaking, they
vote according to the distance between the ideal policy they have in mind
and the real policy a government sets. This conjecture is subtle. Usually, in
Bayesian games, we have good and bad types of individuals. The concept
of “good”or “bad”is a-priori determined. A good type is who pursues the
society’s interest and the bad is who pursues its own interests. In a spatial
voting model the concept of “goodness”or “badness”is more relative. Since
the exclusive criterion agents use to evaluate a politician is represented by
the distance, they perceive a candidate as good if that candidate chooses a
closer policy to their IP than another candidate, who is automatically per-
ceived as bad. Thus, voters tend to evaluate candidates according to a very
egoistic criterium: they only vote candidates who they feel very close to
their needs. This is not far from what happens in the real world. Everyone
of us casts his vote evaluating the “distance”he feels between his position
and candidate’s position. Notice that the distance perceived may be due to
several reasons: one may decide to vote for a candidate because he evaluates
that he will provide him more money transfers or may vote for it because he
feels that the ideological distance is small. A voter may adopt different cri-
teria of evaluation, but the important thing here is that he is always able to
translate his evaluation in a metric distance, and vote for a candidate whose
distance from his IP is the minimum. Mathematically speaking, we are solv-
ing a duality problem: minimising the distance between the voter’s IP and
the candidate’s policy means maximising the voter’s utility. Secondly, refer-
ring to the resolution of the yardstick game, it will be demonstrated that in
a situation where voters are not able to evaluate the type of incumbent and
the type of shock which affects the economy but they perfectly evaluate the
outcome of policies of different jurisdictions, equilibria may be both pooling
and separating. Thus, the yardstick competition may exacerbate the will-
2the literature on spatial voting models is huge: see Hinich & Ordeshook, 1970 ([13]),
Davis, DeGroot & Hinich, 1972 ([10]), Hinich, 1977 ([12]), Hinich & Pollard, 1981 ([14])
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ingness of bad candidates of immediately separate from good candidates. As
a consequence the yardstick competition contributes to select good and bad
politicians but also acts an incentive device to promote efficiency. The paper
is organized as follows: section 1 briefly introduce the voting model litera-
ture, section 2 analyses the general features of the model, section 3 analyses
a model characterized by complete information, section 4 and 5 analyses
the same model in which there exists asymmetrical information both in the
absence and in the presence of yardstick competition, section 6 and 7 adds
the presence of shocks in the model, section 8 concludes. Finally, Appendix
A provides a technical discussion of the most important lemmas of spatial
voting models and Appendix B provides an analysis of the multivariate case.
2 The model
2.1 Candidates
I consider a two-period model with three political candidates D,R and W,
where D stands for Democratic, R for Republican and W for Welfaristic. On
each party I attached a political label, which I assume is exogenously taken
at the beginning of the electoral campaign. For instance, we may think
about the most familiar labeling system in the U.S., where candidates are
located in a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. In our model we assume
that candidate R is labeled as “conservative”and that, in a very simplified
vision, it is supported by voters who get higher utility in the taxation of labor
rather than capital. Otherwise, the candidate D is labeled as “liberal”and
he supports voters who get higher utility in the taxation of capital rather
than labor. Thus, the space of candidates is given by ΘC = {D,R,W}.
Furthermore candidate D may be a good type or a bad type and so may be
candidate R. Thus, the space of type is ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
. Each
candidate may play only 4 policies: two populistic policies (the right-wing
populistic policy aR and the left-wing populistic policy aD), which provide
more welfare to oriented voters, a welfaristic policy aW , which is neutral
and a bad policy abp which enables the government to subtract rents to the
society’s welfare.
2.1.1 Candidate’s preferences
Each candidate has the following preferences ordering:
Candidate D good type: aD  aW  aR  abp
Candidate D bad type: abp  aD  aW  aR
Candidate R good type: aR  aW  aD  abp
Candidate R bad type: abp  aR  aW  aD
These preference orderings may be represented by an utility function r, such
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that ax  ay ⇔ r(ax) ≥ r(ay). Thus, in utility terms, candidate’s prefer-
ences may be represented in the following manner:
Candidate D good type: r(aD) > r(aW ) >
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
r(aR) > r(abp)
Candidate D bad type: r(abp) > r(aD) >
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
r(aW ) > r(aR)
Candidate R good type: r(aR) > r(aW ) >
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
r(aD) > r(abp)
Candidate R bad type: r(abp) > r(aR) >
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
r(aW ) > r(aD)
To facilitate calculations, I assume the existence of a strict preferences or-
dering (the inequality is strict) and that the third term of the ordering is
normalized to zero.
2.2 Voters
I suppose the existence of a population of voters, portioned in three equal
groups (i.e. 1 voter per group): the welfarist voters, who are those who have
not any particular preference for a candidate, candidate D-oriented voters,
who support the Democratic Party and candidate R-oriented voters, who
support the Republican Party.
2.2.1 Voter’s preferences
Each voter has the following preferences ordering:
D-oriented Voter: aD  aW  aR  abp
R-oriented Voter: aR  aW  aD  abp
Welfarist Voter: aW  aD ∨ aR  abp
Voters observe candidate policies and cast their vote for the candidate who
has selected the nearest policy to their IP. In Appendix A I provide a tech-
nical explanation of the mechanism adopted by voters to select which is the
candidate who provide them the highest utility.
3 A complete information case
Suppose a two-period game where the population is represented by only
three voters (D,R,W) and two candidates (D,R) which duel to obtain the
power. Suppose also that the economy is not affected by shocks. With-
out loss of generality, I assume that party R is the incumbent and party D
is the challenger. Each candidate has to choose a vector of policy in the
two-dimension Cartesian space <2; the vector of policies encompasses the
marginal tax rate on labor and the marginal tax rate on capital and is rep-
resented by a singleton in the space. At the end of the mandate, elections
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take place. Voters perfectly recognize the type of candidate, so that parties
cannot exploit any information advantage, and they cast their vote to the
party which chooses a policy vector closer to their IPs. [FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the IP of each voter (black singletons), while concentric cir-
cles represents voter’s indifference curves. The smaller the circle, the nearer
the policy chosen by a candidate to the voter’s IP and the higher the utility
the voter gets. Voters who support the Republican party have an ideal point
such as R, where the tax rate on capital is equal to zero and the tax rate on
labor is equal to one. Symmetrically, voters who support the Democratic
party have an ideal point such as D, where the tax rate on labor is equal
to zero and the tax rate on capital in equal to one. In the middle of the
space, on W, are located welfaristic voters, that may be intended as “super-
rational”voters who do not have any particular preference toward one of the
two candidates.
Circles correctly represent the voters’ utility preferences only if voters as-
sign exactly the same weight to every dimension of the policy space. If
not, the utility preference is given by a non circular structure, that indi-
cates that the decrease in utility is not the same in every dimension. In
my example we have a policy vector given by a = {τl, τk} in the Cartesian
space τl× τk; we can represent voters’ preferences with circles if and only if:
∂U(τl,τk)
∂τl
= ∂U(τl,τk)∂τk ; otherwise, if
∂U(τl,τk)
∂τl
6= ∂U(τl,τk)∂τk voters’ preferences are
represented by ellipses, where the longer axis refers to that dimension which
shows the higher decrease in the utility with respect to the other dimension,
once we move away from the IP. Figure 2 sketches a typical situation where
the decrease in utility is not the same in every direction. Furthermore, the
rotation of the major and the minor axis of the elliptical contours of each
citizen’s loss function may be represented by a matrix of coefficients. If
this matrix is equal for every voter, then we are in the “common orienta-
tion”case, and the ellipses have the same rotation axis.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Finally, voters’ preferences are uniformly distributed (in a discrete case),
while they are represented by a density function, say f(x), which is radial
symmetric3 and unimodal (in a continuous case). Figure 3 shows the candi-
dates’ IPs. Initially, we assume that candidate IPs must only stand over the
budget constraint line; this assumption may be realistic as candidates are
Welfaristic with a slight preference toward one of the two ideological voters.
Thus, candidates can only choose a policy which stands over the budget
constraint line.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Furthermore, I assume that the party which gets the majority of votes win
the elections; in the case of a tie a coin is tossed as to decide which party
will take power. Finally the utility that voters get in the second period of
3that is f(x) = f(−x)
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the game is discounted by a discount factor β ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1 In an economy with a finite number of identical voters the
two parties choose the vector of policies which exactly coincides with the
Welfarist voter’s IP, if and only if they discount the future sufficiently little;
otherwise, they prefer to locate exactly on their preferred IPs.
Proof : In the second period of the game, once the elections have taken
place, the elected candidate chooses the policy which stands on its IP (aD
for party D and aR for party R). Otherwise, in the first period, parties choose
the policy which maximizes the expected utility over the two periods. Since
the two parties can only play either a populistic policy or a welfaristic policy,
we can depict this situation of strategic interaction between the two parties
by the meaning of the following game:
aR aW
aD r(aD) + 1
2
βr(aD); r(aR) + 1
2
r(aR) r(aD); r(aW ) + βr(aR)
aW r(aW ) + βr(aD); r(aR) r(aW ) + 1
2
βr(aD); r(aW ) + 1
2
βr(aB)
Rows show policies played by party D, while columns policies played by party
R and the four boxes show payoffs of the game with the two parties’ expected
utilities. If party R plays aR Party D plays aD if and only if r(aD|aR) >
r(aW |aR). This happens when r(aD)+ 12βr(aD) > r(aW )+βr(aD) or when
β ∈ [0, 2(1 − aW
aD
)). If party R plays aW Party D plays aD if and only if
r(aD|aW ) > r(aW |aW ). This happens when r(aD) > r(aW ) + 12βr(aD) or
β ∈ [0, 2(1− aW
aD
)). The same holds for party R.
Then, we may distinguish three cases:
1. when β ∈ [0, 2(1− aW
aD
)) the only one Nash equilibrium is one such that
the two parties play a populistic strategy which enables them to get
the maximum utility; elections’ outcome is a tie and a coin is tossed
to decide which candidate will take power in the second period.
2. when β ∈ (2(1 − aW
aD
), 1] the only one Nash equilibrium is one such
that the two parties play the welfaristic policy which coincides with
the welfaristic voter’s IP; elections’ outcome is again a tie.
3. when β = 2(1 − aW
aD
) the two parties are indifferent to play either aD
or aW and then infinite equilibria in mixed strategies arise.
4 A game with incomplete information and ab-
sence of shocks
Suppose now to modify the space of types and consider the existence of
two types of candidates both for the incumbent and for the challenger
(say a good and a bad type). Thus, the space of types can be written
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as ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
, where g denotes the good type and b the bad
type. Furthermore, I introduce an asymmetry in information between the
two parties, such that the incumbent does not know whether it is challenging
a good or a bad opponent; it only knows that there exists an a priori prob-
ability equal to q that the challenger is a good type and a probability equal
to 1 - q that the challenger is a bad type. The distribution of probability
is common knowledge between candidates and voters, in the sense that also
voters know the existence of this a-priori probability that candidate is good
(this probability may be see as the reputation of the candidate). Figure 4
shows the policy Cartesian space τl × τk, which can be normalized to 1× 1.
The straight line represents the Government budget constraint being equal
to zero. With respect to the previous case, two additional IP point (GDb
and GRb) have been added and they represent the IP of bad Governments
(party D and R respectively). These two points represent a location where
Governments can get a rent which is equal to the distance from any policy
which stands in the North-East triangle above the budget constraint line
and the budget constraint line. The longer this distance, the higher the rent
subtracted by the Government.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
I study two cases where the incumbent may be either a good or a bad type.
In the first I study a case where the incumbent may face a good challenger
which is “super-welfarist ”in a sense that he always plays strategy aW or a
bad Government who can only play strategy abp. Thus, the game can be
formalized in the following structure:
ΘC = {D,R,W}
ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
AI = AD =
{
aD, aR, aW , abp
}
⊆ E2
AGg = ARg =
{
aW
}
⊆ E2
AGb = ARb =
{
abp
}
⊆ E2
Pr(θR = θRg) = q
Pr(θR = θRb) = 1− q
In the second example the incumbent may face either a good challenger
who can only play a conservative policy aR, or a bad challenger who again
can only play strategy abp. In this second case the problem is formalized as
follows:
8
ΘC = {D,R,W}
ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb
}
AI = AD =
{
aD, aR, aW , abp
}
⊆ E2
AGg = ARg =
{
aR
}
⊆ E2
AGb = ARb =
{
abp
}
⊆ E2
Pr(θR = θRg) = q
Pr(θR = θRb) = 1− q
Furthermore, there exists an asymmetric information between candidates
and voters, since also voters are not able to evaluate whether a candidate
is a good or a bad type. Nevertheless, the concept of goodness that candi-
dates have differs to the concept of goodness that voters have. Candidates
believe a candidate is good if he acts in the society’s interest whilst he is
bad if he acts exclusively in his own interest. Otherwise, voters believe a
candidate is good if he undertakes a policy which is the closest to their IP,
regardless of the overall effects which this policy has on society and believe
a candidate is bad if he acts in his own interest. This concept of goodness
differs with respect to the previous literature where it was seen in an abso-
lute value (a politician is good if he does whatever to increase the welfare
of society) whilst in this paper it is seen as a relative value (a politician
is good if he does whatever to increase my welfare regardless to the oth-
ers’ welfare). This asymmetry in information is a typical agency problem.
Voters are only able to appraise incumbents’ performance, in the absence of
yardstick competition and incumbents’ relative performance in the yardstick
competition case, (i.e. from the media). After having observed incumbents’
performance, voters update their beliefs about the goodness of politicians
and cast their vote in the elections according to these beliefs. Thus, the
timing of the game is the following: first, Nature chooses incumbent type.
Then, each incumbent announces (and commits) to a policy. Voters observe
incumbents’ announcements and update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Fi-
nally, according to their updated beliefs they decide whether to reelect the
incumbent or not. Denotating with γ ex-post beliefs, I assume that voters
decide to reelect the incumbent if and only if γ ≥ q. In this framework, it is
very easy to see that voters attribute γ = 1 if the policy of one candidate is
nearer to their IP than the policy of the other candidate, γ = 0 if the policy
of one candidate is farer to their IP than the policy of the other candidate,
and γ = 12 if the policy of one candidate is as near to their IP as the policy
of the other candidate. I find perfect Bayesian equilibria of this tax-setting
game.
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Proposition 2 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)−r(aW ))), whilst he plays the welfaristic strat-
egy aW if q ∈ ( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1].
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD) + β(1− q)r(aD) is always greater than EU(aR) =
r(aR) + β(1− q)r(aR) and than EU(abp) = r(abp) + 12β(1− q)r(aD), whilst
it is greater than EU(aW ) = r(aW ) + 12βqr(a
D) + β(1 − q)r(aD) for q ∈
[0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )))4.
This result can be interpreted as follows: if the probability to face a
good challenger is sufficiently small, the incumbent has a great opportunity
to play a policy which stays on his IP. Otherwise, if the probability to face
a good challenger is high, the incumbent realizes that playing his preferred
policy would not be sufficiently safe to assure the re-election and then he
prefers to play a welfaristic policy to get the welfaristic citizens’ votes.
Proposition 3 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp))), whilst he plays the bad
policy abp if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp)), 1]
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD) + β(1− q)r(abp) is always greater than EU(aR) =
r(aR) + β(1 − q)r(abp) and EU(abp) = r(abp) + 12β(1 − q)r(abp) is always
greater than EU(aW ) = r(aW ) + 12βqr(a
bp) + β(1 − q)r(abp). EU(aD) is
greater than EU(abp) for q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp))).
The result says that if the probability that the incumbent faces a good
challenger is sufficiently low he plays the populistic strategy, since the elec-
torate is always able to see the bad strategy undertaken by the party (bad
type) and reelect the incumbent, since it is not able to evaluate whether the
type is good or bad. Otherwise, if the probability to face a good challenger
is high, the bad incumbent realizes that it becomes too costly mimicking a
good type (which would entail a pooling equilibrium) and so he plays the
bad policy even though he knows that he will lose the elections. As a con-
sequence a separating equilibrium arises. Analyse now the situation where
the government (good type) is committed to play the populistic strategy.
Proposition 4 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)−r(aW ))), whilst he plays the welfaristic strat-
egy aW if q ∈ ( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1]
4A note: In all the proofs, the expression always greater which refers to the expected
utility of a strategy with respect to another may be read as that strategy whose expected
utility is always greater than another strategy’s expected utility strictly dominates that other
strategy.
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Proof : same as before.
Proposition 5 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp))), whilst he plays the bad
policy abp if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp)), 1]
Proof : same as before.
5 A case of yardstick competition
I introduce now the yardstick competition framework. The main goal is to
verify how the introduction of another jurisdiction may act as a discipline
device for candidates. I suppose that domestic voters are able to update
their beliefs about the domestic government by comparing the policy it un-
dertakes with that undertaken by the foreigner jurisdiction. I demonstrate
that, due to this comparison, the bad domestic candidate refrains himself
to mimic the good type, since the mimicking strategy would become too
costly for him. As a consequence, we expect a reinforcement of separating
equilibria and a weakening of pooling equilibria. I consider at first a foreign
government which can be either a good or a bad type. If he is good, he plays
a welfaristic strategy aWF , whilst if he is bad, he plays a bad policy strat-
egy abpF . Later on, I will consider a good government committed to play a
populistic strategy aRF , instead of playing aWF , whilst the bad government
plays the bad policy strategy abpF . Thus, the game can be formalized in the
following terms:
ΘC =
{
D,R,W,DF , RF ,WF
}
ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb, θDgF , θDbF , θRgF , θRbF
}
AI = AD =
{
aD, aR, aW , abp
}
⊆ E2
AIF = AD =
{
aDF , aRF , aWF , abpF
}
⊆ E2
AGg = ARg =
{
aW
}
⊆ E2
AGb = ARb =
{
abp
}
⊆ E2
AGgF = ARgF =
{
aWF
}
⊆ E2
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AGbF = ARbF =
{
abpF
}
⊆ E2
Pr(θR = θRg) = q
Pr(θR = θRb) = 1− q
Pr(θRF = θRgF ) = x
Pr(θRF = θRbF ) = 1− x
Again I find perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game.
Proposition 6 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic policy
aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD) − r(aW ))), whilst he plays the welfaristic policy
aW if q ∈ ( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1].
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD) + β(1 − q)(1 − x)r(aD) is always greater than
EU(aR) = r(aR)+β(1− q)(1−x)r(aD) and EU(aD) is always greater than
EU(abp) = r(aW )+ 12β(1−q)(1−x)r(aD). EU(aD) is greater than EU(aW )
for q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW ))).
Proposition 7 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the populistic policy
aD if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp)(1− x))), whilst he plays
the bad policy abp if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D)− r(abp) + 12βr(abp)(1− x)), 1].
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD) + β(1 − q)(1 − x)r(aD) is always greater than
EU(aR) = r(aR)+β(1− q)(1−x)r(aD) and EU(aD) is always greater than
EU(abp) = r(aW )+ 12β(1−q)(1−x)r(aD). EU(aD) is greater than EU(aW )
for q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW ))).
These results show how the probability to face a foreigner good type directly
enters into the equilibrium intervals, meaning that the domestic incument
changes the policies played not only taking into account the probability to
face a good domestic challenger, but also taking into account the probability
to find a good foreign Government.
Suppose now to slightly change the previous game, such as the domestic
government (good type) plays the populistic policy aR instead of the wel-
faristic policy aW . The game becomes:
ΘC =
{
D,R,W,DF , RF ,WF
}
ΘG =
{
θDg, θDb, θRg, θRb, θDgF , θDbF , θRgF , θRbF
}
AI = AD =
{
aD, aR, aW , abp
}
⊆ E2
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AIF = AD =
{
aDF , aRF , aWF , abpF
}
⊆ E2
AGg = ARg =
{
aR
}
⊆ E2
AGb = ARb =
{
abp
}
⊆ E2
AGgF = ARgF =
{
aWF
}
⊆ E2
AGbF = ARbF =
{
aRbF
}
⊆ E2
Pr(θR = θRg) = q
Pr(θR = θRb) = 1− q
Pr(θRF = θRgF ) = x
Pr(θRF = θRbF ) = 1− x
Proposition 8 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, r(aW )+(xβ−1)r(aD)1
2
βr(aD)−βr(aD)(1−x)), whilst he plays the welfaristic policy
aW if q ∈ ( r(aW )+(xβ−1)r(aD)1
2
βr(aD)−βr(aD)(1−x)), 1].
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD)+ 12βqr(a
D)+β(1− q)r(aD) is always greater than
EU(aR) = r(aR)+ 12βqr(a
D)+β(1− q)r(aD) and EU(aD) is always greater
than EU(abp) = r(abp) + 12β(1 − q)(1 − x)r(aD). EU(aD) is greater than
EU(aW ) for q ∈ [0, r(aW )+(xβ−1)r(aD)1
2
βr(aD)−βr(aD)(1−x)).
Proposition 9 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD if q ∈ [0, (1+β)r(aD)−r(abp)−
1
2
βr(aD)(1−x)
1
2
βr(aDx)
), whilst he plays the bad policy
abp if q ∈ ( (1+β)r(aD)−r(abp)−
1
2
βr(aD)(1−x)
1
2
xβr(aD)
), 1].
Proof : EU(aD) = r(aD) + βqr(aD) + β(1− q)r(aD) is always greater than
EU(aR) = r(aR) + βqr(aD) + β(1− q)r(aD) and EU(aD) is always greater
than EU(abp) = r(abp) + 12β(1 − q)(1 − x)r(aD). EU(aD) is greater than
EU(aW ) for q ∈ [0, (1+β)r(aD)−r(abp)−
1
2
βr(aD)(1−x)
1
2
xβr(aD)
).
Table 1 compares equilibria obtained in the absence of yardstick compe-
tition case with equilibria obtained in the presence of the yardstick compe-
tition. It is easy to see that strategies played by governments do not differ
in the two cases. Otherwise, the difference refers to the broadness of equi-
libria intervals. In the yardstick competition case intervals where the bad
government adopts a mimicking strategy are narrower than those obtained
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in the absence of yardstick competition case, which suggests that separating
equilibria are more likely to happen. Furthermore, this suggests the impor-
tant role played by the yardstick competition as a self-selection device. Once
voters have the possibility to compare domestic and foreign policies, bad can-
didates realize that it becomes more costly to mimic the good governments
and then prefer to immediately separate. This is a positive result because
it shows as bad candidates are more likely to be recognized and thrown out
of the office. Otherwise, the yardstick competition fails to achieve the disci-
pline device goal. In fact, bad politicians are not forced to behave efficiently
and thus this entails that voters are worse off. In this economic environment,
the conclusion about the role of the yardstick competition is that there ex-
ists a trade-off between the self-selection goal and the discipline device goal.
Since I supposed the existence of perfect correlation among economies, my
results support the theory by Bordignon et al. ([7]) which affirms that “the
larger is the degree of correlation between economies, the more the citizen
learns by observing the fiscal choices in the other jurisdiction, and the more
difficult it is for the bad politician to escape detection when cheating ”.
environment eq.strategy/intervals
1/n/g aD/[0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )))
aW /( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1]
1/y/g aD/[0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )))
aW /( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1]
1/n/b aD/[0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)), 1]
1/y/b aD/[0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (r(a
D)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (r(a
D)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)), 1]
2/n/g aD/[0, 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )))
aW /( 2
βr(aD)
(r(aD)− r(aW )), 1]
2/y/g aD/[0,
−r(aD)+r(aW )+xβr(aD)
1
2βr(a
D)−βr(aD)(1−x) )
aW /(
−r(aD)+r(aW )+xβr(aD)
1
2βr(a
D)−βr(aD)(1−x) , 1]
2/n/b aD/[0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD)− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)), 1]
2/y/b aD/[0,
(1+β)r(aD)−r(abp)− 12βr(aD)(1−x)
1
2βr(a
D)x
)
abp/(
(1+β)r(aD)−r(abp)− 12βr(aD)(1−x)
1
2βr(a
D)x
), 1]
Table 1 - equilibrium strategy - Legend : (1) refers to the case where the good government
is committed to play the welfaristic strategy and (2) where is committed to play the populistic
strategy; (n) indicitates the absence of yardstick competition case and (y) the presence of yardstick
competition case and (g) indicates the government good type and (b) the government bad type.
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6 A game with incomplete information and pres-
ence of shocks
In this second part, I allow for the possibility that some shocks may occur
in the economy; these shocks may be seen as all of those exogenous events
which may increase (or decrease) efficiency in the production of public goods.
Shocks may be either positive (P) or negative (N); if a shock is positive, then
the efficiency in the production increases whilst if the shock is negative the
efficiency decreases. An increase in efficiency may be seen as the possibility
to produce the same amount of good at a lower cost, or to produce an higher
amount of that good at the same cost. The cost of production is borne by
taxation and thus, citizens are better off when a shock is positive, since
they pay less taxes. An important assumption here is that the sign and
the magnitude of the shock is a private information of candidates, which
perfectly observe whether these are positive or negative. Otherwise, voters
only perceive the existence of shocks but are not able to measure neither the
magnitude nor the sign. Thus, at the beginning of the game, Nature choose
both the type of candidates and the type of shock. Candidates observe
Nature’s choice and then announce (and commit) to a policy which depends
on the type of shock, that is a(); voters observe candidate’s policies and
vote for the candidate who chooses the nearest policy with respect to their
IP.
6.1 Positive shock
Suppose at first that the economy is affected by a positive shock. I write
the preferences for every government type.
θDg : r(aD(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aR(P )) > 0 > r(aD(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aR(N )) > r(abp)
θDb : r(abp) > r(aD(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aR(N )) > 0 > r(aD(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aR(P ))
θRg : r(aR(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aD(P )) > 0 > r(aR(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aD(N )) > r(abp)
θRb : r(abp) > r(aR(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aD(N )) > 0 > r(aR(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aD(P ))
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Figure 5 shows the IP of each government type when the shock is positive.
Line BC indicates the locus where the budget constraint is equal to zero.
This is a private information of the government. Notice that the welfaristic
strategy W and the strategy played by government good type GDg and
GRg stands exactly over the budget constraint line, while those played by
government bad type entails tax rates which are higher than those needed
to clear the budget. This means that bad government collect more taxes
and the difference between the taxes collected and taxes needed to clear
the budget represents the government’s rent. Graphically, this rent is repre-
sented by the distance between the Government bad type IP and the budget
constraint line.
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Proposition 10 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic
strategy aD(P ) if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))−r(aW (P )))), whilst he plays
the welfaristic policy aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))− r(aW (P ))), 1].
Proof : The bad policy, policies which are a function of the negative shock
and policies which stand on the B’s IP are strictly dominated by aD(P )
and aW (P ).
Notice here that a government (good type) always chooses a policy which
stands over the budget constraint line, even though the exact location over
this line aD(P ) or aW (P ) changes with respect to probability intervals.
Proposition 11 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the populistic strat-
egy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp(P ))
(r(aD(N )) − r(abp) + 12βr(abp))), whilst he
plays the bad policy abp if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp(P ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(abp) + 12βr(abp)), 1]
Proof : the bad policy and the populistic strategy strictly dominates all the
other strategies.
Notice in this case how a bad incumbent is willing to make voters believe
that a shock is negative, since if they believed so, he would be able to adopt
a policy which would stand at a closer point to his IP.
6.2 Negative shock
Suppose now that the economy is affected by a negative shock and write
again the preferences for every government type.
θDg : r(aD(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aR(N )) > 0 > r(aD(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aR(P )) > r(abp)
θDb : r(abp) > r(aD(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aR(N )) > 0 > r(aD(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aR(P ))
θRg : r(aR(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aD(N )) > 0 > r(aR(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aD(P )) > r(abp)
θRb : r(abp) > r(aR(N )) > r(aW (N )) > r(aD(N )) > 0 > r(aR(P )) > r(aW (P )) > r(aD(P ))
[FIGURE 6 HERE] Figure 6 shows the Ideal Point of each government
type when the shock is negative. Line BC indicates the locus where the
budget constraint is equal to zero. Unlike the previous case, this time the
budget constraint stand north-eastward; this means that is more costly for
Government to produce public goods and it needs a higher level of taxation.
Notice also how the welfaristic strategy W does not stand over the same
line where the strategy played by government good type GDg and GRg
stands. Indeed, every time taxes are lower, welfare of welfaristic voters
increases and then, they would accept that the government overspend its
budget if this would help to increase his wealth. As before, strategies played
by government bad type entail higher tax rates than those needed to clear
the budget.
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Proposition 12 If the incumbent is a good type, he plays the populistic
policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N )))), whilst he plays
the welfaristic policy aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 2
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N ))), 1].
Proof : same as for the positive shock.
Proposition 13 If the incumbent is a bad type, he plays the bad policy abp
if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(abp)−r(aR(N ))− 12βr(abp))), whilst he plays the populistic
policy aR(P ) if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)
(r(abp)− r(aR(N ))− 12βr(abp)), 1].
Proof : same as for the positive shock.
7 A case of yardstick competition with presence
of shocks
I analyse now the case of yardstick competition in the presence of shocks
where, once again, shocks may be either positive or negative.
7.1 The shock is positive
I suppose that the domestic good incumbent’s preferred policy is aR(P ),
whilst the bad incumbent’s preferred policy is abp. Furhermore, the foreign
good incumbent’s preferred policy is aW (P ).
Proposition 14 If the incumbent is a good type, he chooses the populis-
tic policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 1
βr(aD(P ))(1−x)(r(a
D(P ))(xβ − 1)+ r(aW (P )))),
whilst he chooses the welfaristic policy aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 1
βr(aD(P ))(1−x)(r(a
D(P )(xβ−
1) + r(aW (P ))), 1].
Proof : same as for the absence of yardstick competition case.
Proposition 15 If the incumbent is a bad type, he chooses the populistic
policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D(N ))−r(abp)(1− β2 (1−x)))), whilst
he chooses the bad policy abp if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D(N ))−r(abp)(1− β2 (1−
x))), 1].
Proof : same as for the absence of yardstick competition case.
7.2 The shock is negative
Proposition 16 If the incumbent is a good type, he chooses the populis-
tic policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aW (N )) − r(aD(N )))), whilst he
chooses the welfaristic policy aW (P ) if q ∈ ( 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aW (N ))−r(aD(N ))), 1].
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Proof : same as for the absence of yardstick competition case.
Proposition 17 If the incumbent is a bad type, he chooses the populistic
policy aD(N ) if q ∈ [0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D(N ))−r(abp)(1− β2 (1−x)))), whilst
he chooses the bad policy abp(P ) if q ∈ ( 2
βr(abp)(1−x)(r(a
D(N ))− r(abp)(1−
β
2 (1− x))), 1]
Proof : same as for the absence of yardstick competition case.
Table 2 summarizes overall results for an economy characterized by
shocks.
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environment eq.strategy/intervals
1/n/g/p aD(P )/[0, 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))− r(aW (P ))))
aW (P )/( 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))− r(aW (P ))), 1]
1/n/g/n aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N )))
aW (N )/( 2
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N )), 1]
1/n/b/p aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD(N ))− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)
(r(aD(N ))− r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)), 1]
1/n/b/n aD(N )/[0,
2(r(aD(N ))−r(aW (N ))
βr(abp)
)))ifβ >
2(r(abp)−r(aA(N ))
r(abp)
aW (N )/(
2(r(aD(N ))−r(aW (N ))
βr(abp)
)), 1]
abp/[0,
2(r(abp)(1− β2 )+r(aw(N )))
βr(abp)
)ifβ <
2(r(abp)−r(aA(N ))
r(abp)
aW (N )/(
2(r(abp)(1− β2 )+r(aw(N )))
βr(abp)
, 1]
1/y/g/p aD(P )/[0, 1
βr(aD(P ))(1−x) (r(a
D(P ))(xβ − 1) + r(aW (P ))))
aW (P )/( 1
βr(aD(P ))(1−x) (r(a
D(P ))(xβ − 1) + r(aW (P ))), 1]
1/y/g/n aD(N )/[0, 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N ))))
aW (N )/( 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))− r(aW (N ))), 1]
1/y/b/p aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (r(a
D(N ))− r(abp)(1− β
2
(1− x))))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (r(a
D(N ))− r(abp)(1− β
2
(1− x))), 1]
1/y/b/n aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)
( 1
2
βr(abp)− r(abp) + r(aD(N )))
abp/(∗, 2
βr(abp)
(− 1
2
βr(abp) + r(abp)− r(aW (N )))
aW (N/( 2
βr(abp)
(− 1
2
βr(abp) + r(abp)− r(aW (N )), 1]
2/n/g/p aD(P )/[0, 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P )) + 1
2
βr(aD(P ))− r(aW (P )))
aW (P )/( 2
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P )) + 1
2
βr(aD(P ))− r(aW (P )), 1]
2/n/g/n aD(N )/[0, 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))(1 + β
2
)− r(aW )(N )))
aW (N/( 1
βr(aD(N ))
(r(aD(N ))(1 + β
2
)− r(aW )(N )), 1]
2/n/b/p aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)
(r(abp)(β
2
− 1) + r(aD(N )))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)
(r(abp)(β
2
− 1) + r(aD(N )), 1]
2/n/b/n aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)
(( 1
2
β − 1)r(abp) + r(aD(N )))
abp/(∗∗, 1
βr(abp)
(( 1
2
β + 1)r(abp)− r(aW (N )))
aW (N )/( 1
βr(abp)
((12β + 1)r(abp)− r(aW (N )), 1]
2/y/g/p aD(P )/[0, 1
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))− r(aW (P )) + 1
2
βr(aD(P )))
aW (P )/( 1
βr(aD(P ))
(r(aD(P ))− r(aW (P )) + 1
2
βr(aD(P )), 1]
2/y/g/n aD(N )/[0, 1
βr(aD(N ))(1−x) (r(a
D(N ))− r(aW (N )) + 1
2
βr(aD(N ))(1− x))
aW (N )/( 1
βr(aD(N ))(1−x) (r(a
D(N ))− r(aW (N )) + 1
2
βr(aD(N ))(1− x), 1]
2/y/b/p aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (a
D(N ) + 1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)− r(abp))
abp/( 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (a
D(N ) + 1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)− r(abp), 1]
2/y/b/n aD(N )/[0, 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (
1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)− r(abp) + r(aD(N )))
abp/(∗ ∗ ∗, 2
βr(abp)
(−r(aW (N )) + r(abp) + 1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)))
aW (N )/( 2
βr(abp)(2−x) (−r(aW (N )) + r(abp) +
1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)), 1]
Table 2 - equilibrium strategy - Legend : (1) refers to the case where the good government
is committed to play the welfaristic strategy and (2) where is committed to play the populistic
strategy; (n) indicitates the absence of yardstick competition case and (y) the presence of yard-
stick competition case and (g) indicates the government good type and (b) the government bad
type. (∗) 2
βr(abp)
( 1
2
βr(abp)− r(abp)+ r(aD(N ));(∗∗) 2
βr(abp)
( 1
2
βr(abp)− r(abp)+ r(aD(N ));(∗ ∗
∗) 2
βr(abp)(1−x) (
1
2
βr(abp)(1− x)− r(abp) + r(aD(N ))
19
The comparison of results in Table 2 enables us to evaluate the effect
of the yardstick competition both as a selective and discipline device. The
first observation is that values assumed by parameters of the model (the
probability that the foreign government is good and the discount rate) are
crucial. Thus, to understand how the introduction of the yardstick competi-
tion affects the equilibria, I performed some numerical simulations. Table 3
shows the payoffs for every strategy played and for each type and shock (i.e.
b/p stands for bad player and positive shock). Furthermore, Table 4 shows
the numerical values which intervals assumes for every equilibrium strategy
played in every situation. First of all, notice that when the type is good
and the shock is positive the interval where the strategy aD(P ) (aW (P )) is
played is narrower (broader) in the absence of the yardstick competition, for
every value of β and x. This means that the yardstick competition forces the
good government to play the welfaristic strategy. In this case, it is possible
to argue that the introduction of another government acts as a discipline
device for the domestic government behavior. The same holds when the
shock is negative. When the type is bad, we must distinguish two cases.
The first case is when the shock is positive; we are in a situation where the
interval where the bad government plays the bad policy is broader than the
yardstick competition case, meaning that the existence of a benchmark gov-
ernment forces the bad incumbent to separate in the first period and lose
elections. This is a case where the yardstick competition acts a selection
device. The second case is when the shock is negative. In this situation we
must distinguish other two sub-cases, which depend on the parameter β. In
fact, when the discount rate is sufficiently high (β > 0.2) the bad incumbent
never plays the bad policy, whilst when β is sufficiently low (β < 0.2) the
bad incumbent replaces the populistic policy previously played, with the
bad policy. This is obvious. When the incumbent discount future more, it
prefers to immediately gain the first-period rent, whilst if it discounts fu-
ture less, it prefers mimicking the good government in the first period to
win elections and playing the bad policy only at the second period. The
introduction of the yardstick competition produces more difficult results to
interpret. In fact, we see that the incumbent may play three equilibrium
strategies depending on the parameters of the model.
g/p b/p g/n b/n
r(aD(P )) 1 0.6 0.7 0.6
r(aW (P )) 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.5
r(aR(P )) 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4
r(aD(N )) 0.7 0.9 1 0.9
r(aW (N )) 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8
r(aR(N )) 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7
r(abp) 0.4 1 0.4 1
Table 3 - Numerical Simulations -
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environment eq.strategy/intervals
1/n/g/p aD(P )/[0, 0.2
β
)
aW (P )/( 0.2
β
, 1]
1/n/g/n aD(N )/[0, 0.2
β
)
aW (N )/( 0.2
β
, 1]
1/n/b/p aD(N )/[0,
0.2(0.5β−0.1)
β
)
abp/(
0.2(0.5β−0.1)
β
, 1]
1/n/b/n aD(N )/[0, 0.2
β
)ifβ > 0.2
aW (N )/( 0.2
β
, 1]
abp/[0,
0.2(1.8−0.5β)
β
)ifβ < 0.2
aW (N )/(
0.2(1.8−0.5β)
β
, 1]
1/y/g/p aD(P )/[0,
(xβ−0.1)
β(1−x) )
aW (P )/(
(xβ−0.1)
β(1−x) , 1]
1/y/g/n aD(N )/[0, 0.1
β
)
aW (N )/( 0.1
β
, 1]
1/y/b/p aD(N )/[0, 0.2
(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x) )
abp/(0.2
(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x) , 1]
1/y/b/n aD(N )/[0, 2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
abp/(2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
, 2
(0.5β+0.2)
β
)
aW (N )/(2
(0.5β+0.2)
β
, 1]
2/n/g/p aD(P )/[0, 2
(0.1+0.5β)
β
)
aW (P )/(2
(0.1+0.5β)
β
, 1]
2/n/g/n aD(N )/[0,
(0.1+0.5β)
β
)
aW (N/(
(0.1+0.5β)
β
, 1]
2/n/b/p aD(N )/[0, 2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
)
abp/(2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
, 1]
2/n/b/n aD(N )/[0, 2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
)
abp/(2
(0.5β−0.1)
β
, 2
(0.5β+0.2)
β
)
aW (N )/(2
(0.5β+0.2)
β
, 1]
2/y/g/p aD(P )/[0, 2
(0.5β+0.1)
β
)
aW (P )/(2
(0.5β+0.1)
β
, 1]
2/y/g/n aD(N )/[0,
(0.5β(1−x)+0.1)
β(1−x) )
aW (N )/(
(0.5β(1−x)+0.1)
β(1−x) , 1]
2/y/b/p aD(N )/[0,
2(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x)
abp/(
2(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x) , 1]
2/y/b/n aD(N )/[0,
2(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x) )
abp/(
2(0.5β(1−x)−0.1)
β(1−x) ,
2(0.5β(1−x)+0.2)
β(1−x) )
aW (N )/(
2(0.5β(1−x)+0.2)
β(1−x) , 1]
Table 4 - Numerical Simulations -
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8 Conclusion
In this papers I analysed a typical yardstick competition game using a spatial
voting model, where voters vote for a candidate according to the distance
between their IP and the policy selected by a candidate. The policy which is
closer to a voter’s IP provides the voter with a higher utility so that minimiz-
ing the distance means maximising the utility. I analysed a benchmark case
with complete information and then I studied the effects of the asymmetri-
cal information between candidates and voters. I demonstrated that, in this
framework, a yardstick competition entails a selection but not a discipline
device, suggesting the existence of a trade off between the two goals. In the
second part, I analysed an economy characterised by the presence of shocks,
whose sign and magnitude are a private information of incumbents. This
time, the introduction of the yardstick competition acts both as a selection
and a discipline device. Of course, this is a real optimistic achievement and
suggests that providing information to voters about the tax rates chosen
by local governments would entail an increase of discipline among politi-
cians. Unfortunately, hardly in the real world one may observe that voters
are completely informed about policies’ outcome. Furthermore, this model
consider an electorate who votes without any concern about ideological or
idiosyncratic preferences. This open more than an opportunity of research
for future works.
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9 Appendix A
Suppose A be a positive definite matrix of weights, x the preferred position (or ideal point, IP)
of a voter i and a the policy vector chosen by a candidate, with a ⊂ E2. Then ‖a− x‖ represents
a quadratic metric loss function or, in other words, the loss which a voter suffers for not to stand
on his IP5.
Furthermore, define a representative voter’s utility function as ui(‖a− x‖A), where ∂ui∂‖a−x‖A <
0, with (‖a− x‖A)2 = (a− x)′A(a− x)
Lemma 1 Suppose there are two policies a′ and a′′. We say that a′ is preferred to a′′ and we
denote it with the expression a′Pa′′ if and only if ‖a′ − x‖ < ‖a′′ − x‖ and thus ui(‖a′ − x‖) <
ui(‖a′′ − x‖). Otherwise, we say that a′′ is preferred to a′ and we denote it with the expression
a′′Pa′ if and only if ‖a′′ − x‖ < ‖a′ − x‖ and thus ui(‖a′′ − x‖) < ui(‖a′ − x‖). Finally, we say
that a′ is indifferent to a′′ and we denote it with the expression a′Ia′′ if and only if ‖a′′ − x‖ =
‖a′ − x‖ and thus ui(‖a′′ − x‖) = ui(‖a′ − x‖).
Let us now introduce the event voter i votes for a∗ and denote the probability of the event
with Pr(i votes for a′) with Pri(‖a′ − x‖−‖a′′ − x‖) and the probability of the event Pr(i votes for
a′) with 1−Pri(i votes for a′′), where Pr is a monotonically non decreasing function, differentiable
and non constant (i.e. Pr′ > 0)
Lemma 2 for every a′ ∈ E2 and a′′ ∈ E2 we say that a′Ra′′ but that not a′′Ra′ if and only if
Pri(‖a′ − x‖ ≤ ‖a′′ − x‖) < 12 . This is called the majority rule. Otherwise, if a′Ra′′ and a′Ra′′
it must be a′Ia′′.
Note that when |a′ − x| = |a′′ − x| then Pr(0) = 1
2
.
In a probabilistic voting model, the probability of voting the policy a′ is a function of the single
voter’s IP. That is y = a
′+a′′
α
where y is a random variable must be:
Pr
i
(y) = 1 if y > δ
Pr
i
(y) =
1
2
if y = δ
Pr
i
(y) = 0 if y < δ
Furthermore, let us introduce the following definitions which deal with the concept of domi-
nance and transitivity.
Lemma 3 We say that a policy a∗ is dominant if and only if a∗Ra, for every a ∈ E2
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition is that a policy a∗ is dominant if and only if, for
every point t ∈ E2 and every number b > 0, it follows that Pr[t′(X − a∗ ≤ b)] ≥ 12 . A natural
problem here arises, due to the multidimensionality of space: indeed it may be the case where a
dominant point may not exist. It can be demonstrated that if the probability density function
(or the discrete frequency function) P ∗ is symmetric about a∗, then a∗ is dominant. Examples of
distribution functions which are symmetric about some point a∗:
- a discrete distribution on a set of 2k+1 points in En {0, a1,−a1, ..., ak,−ak}, such that f(ai) =
−f(ai), for i = 1, ..., k. With this type of distribution a∗ = 0.
- a multivariate normal distribution with mean µ and non-singular covariance matrix Σ. With
this type of distribution a∗ = µ.
- the probability density f on E2 defined by f(a) =
1
2
[f1(a) + f2(a)], where f1 is a multivariate
normal density with mean µ1 and non-singular covariance matrix Σ and f2 is a multivariate normal
density with mean µ2 and non-singular covariance matrix Σ. For this distribution a∗ = 12 (µ1+µ2).
5Notice that, if the voter stands on his ideal point, x = a and the loss function is equal
to zero
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Lemma 4 The distribution P ∗ is said to have a unique median in all directions if, for every
policy a ∈ E2 with a 6= 0 there is a unique real number b such that both Pr(a′X ≤ b) ≥ 12 and
Pr(a′X ≥ b) ≥ 1
2
. Indeed if P ∗ has a unique median in all directions, and supposing that there
exists a dominant policy a∗, then for any two policies a′ ∈ E2 and a′′ ∈ E2, ‖a′ − a∗‖ < ‖a′′ − a∗‖
if and only if a′Pa′′.
The consequences of Lemma 4 are twofold. First of all, the relation R is transitive and
completely orders all of the points E2. Secondly it says that if policy a∗ exists, then it is unique.
10 Appendix B
In this Appendix I provide a demonstration of a game with complete information in a multivariate
case. Suppose that x is a vector and f(x) a multivariate density function. The vote for a candidate
can be expressed in vector notation as:
V (a′, a′′) =
∫
R
f(X)g(x− a)dx
where,
R =
{
x
∥∥x− a′∥∥ < x∥∥x− a′′∥∥} ⊂ En
where R is a set in a n-dimensional Euclidean space which contains the most preferred positions
of all the voters who prefer a′ to a′′. Assume now that y = x − a and ξ = a′ − a′′, so that
‖y‖ = ‖x− a‖ and ‖y + ξ‖ = ‖a′ − a′′‖. Thus, R = {y : ‖y‖ < ‖y + ξ‖}, so that we get
V (a′, a′′) =
∫
R
f(y + a)g(y)dy
Rearrange R, we obtain:
R = {y : ‖y‖ < ‖y + ξ‖} =
{
y : (y1)
2 + (y2)
2 < (y1 − ξ1)2 − (y2 − ξ2)2
}
= {y : 0 < 2ξ1y1 + 2ξ2y2}
Define y∗ = − 2ξ2y2+(ξ1)2+(ξ2)2
2ξ1
we obtain R = {y : y1 > y∗}. Without loss of generality, we
assume that one of the policy is greater than the other; assume, for instance that a′ < a′′. We
use the expression of ξ = a′ − a′′ so that we can express the vector notation as
V (a′, a′′) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ y∗
−∞
f(y1 + a
′
1, y2 + a
′
2)g(y1, g2)dy1dy2
Deriving V (a′, a′′) with respect to a′1, we obtain
∂y∗
∂a′1
=
2ξ2y2 + (ξ2)2
(ξ1)2
− 1
2
By using the Leibnitz’s rule we obtain:
∂V (a′, a′′)
∂a′1
=
∫
R
∂f(y + a)
∂x1
g(y)dy +
∫ +∞
−∞
f(y ∗+a′1, y2 + a′′1 )g(y∗1, y2)[
2ξy2 + (ξ2)2
(ξ1)2)
− 1
2
]dy2
the surprising result we achieve is the existence of an equilibrium where candidates’ policies
do not converge; otherwise, there exists an asymmetric and opposite position with respect to the
mean on either the major or minor axis of f(x), let a′′1 = −a′1 and a′′2 = a′2 = 0. Thus, we obtain
that ξ1 = 2a′1, ξ2 = 0 and y1∗ = a1′.
∂V (a′, a′′)
∂a′1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ 0
−∞
∂f(x1, x2)
∂x1
g(x1 − a′1, x2)dx1dx2 −
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
f(0, x2)g(−a′1, x2)dx2
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We can easily see that
∂V (a′,a′′)
∂a′1
can be divided in two components and that an increase in the
variance of the first term does not affect the second, which means that an equilibrium where the
two candidates are located in different positions may exist and that they do not converge toward
each other along either axis of f(x). Finally, it can be shown that on an axis of f(x) at least a
local equilibrium exists, where
∂V (a′,a′′)
∂a′2
= 0 exists. We observe that ∂y
∗
∂a′2
= − y2+ξ2
ξ1
. We use
again the Leibnitz’s rule and obtain:
∂V (a′, a′′)
∂a′1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ 0
−∞
∂f(x1, x2)
∂x2
g(x1 − a′1)dy
− 1
ξ1
∫ +∞
−∞
f(y1 ∗+a′1, y2 + a′′1 )g(y1∗, y2)(y2 + ξ2)dy2
Imposing a′′1 = −a′1 and a′′2 = a′2 as local equilibrium state and x = y + a′ we obtain:
∂V (a′, a′′)
∂a′1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ 0
−∞
∂f(x1, x2)
∂x2
g(x1 − a′1, x2)dx1dx2
− 1
2a′2
∫ +∞
−∞
[x2 − a′2]f(0, x2)g(−a′1, x2 − a′2)dx2
and imposing the condition a′2 = 0 due to a rotation of the f(x) axe of the coordinate space we
obtain
∂V (a′, a′′)
∂a′1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ 0
−∞
x2f(0, x2)g(−a′1, x2)dx2 = 0
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